2. This acousmatic space is associated with a virtual causality: tones act upon one another, regardless of the physical causes of the sounds in which we hear them. A melody can therefore be passed from instrument to instrument without interruption, each note being heard as the effect of the one preceding it.
3. This virtual causality is sometimes perceived as physical relations are perceived: namely, as law-like and inevitable. More often, however, the order that we hear in tones is an order of *action*: one tone does not merely give rise to its successor; it creates the conditions which make the successor a right or appropriate response to it. The order that we hear in music is one that is familiar to us from our own lives: the order of intention, in which one thing serves as the reason for another.
4. Finally, we should not think of sounds and tones as distinct individuals—as though tones really existed apart from sounds. Perhaps the best way of understanding the relation between the two is in the way that Spinoza understood the relation between mind and body. For Spinoza reality can be conceptualized in two ways: as mental or as physical. But that which we conceptualize in these two ways is *one*. Moreover, the two ways of conceptualizing the world (the two attributes) are incommensurable. I cannot pass from one to the other, or use the one to explain or predict the other: each is self-contained, autonomous, and self-sufficient. In a similar way, acoustical and musical events are identical. But you cannot slip back and forth between one way of understanding sound and the other. We hear the sound world as a whole when we hear it musically: but what we hear has ceased, in our understanding, to affect us as sound. Thus when a sound enters the musical world it is heard in another way—like the cowbells in Mahler's Sixth Symphony, which lose their character as sound and are swamped in music. It is music that you hear in those bells, not sound. This is equally true of such extramusical resources as the wind-machine in Vaughan Williams's *Sinfonia Antartica*.

All those observations return us to the same persistent metaphor: that of musical space, and the movement that occurs in it. But what exactly *is* a metaphor? And what is the significance of the claim that this particular metaphor is indispensable to the experience of music?

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3 Imagination and Metaphor

Abstract: Develops an account of metaphor, in terms of the theory of imagination expounded in earlier works, and argues that there are metaphors that are indispensable to the formation of certain kinds of experience (e.g. the musical experience), and that these kinds of experience are therefore beyond the capacity of non-rational beings.

Keywords: imagination, metaphor, musical experience, non-rational being, rationality

Roger Scruton

In Chapter 2 I argued that our experience of music involves an elaborate system of metaphors—metaphors of space, movement, and animation. But this leaves us with three very difficult questions to answer: what is a metaphor? What does it mean to say that an experience 'involves' a metaphor (and is the word 'involves' the right one)? Could we eliminate the metaphor, and describe the object of the musical experience without depending on it? These questions are so important that we must confront them now. Much of what I say in this chapter draws on previous arguments—notably those put forward in *Art and Imagination*—amended in the light of recent discussions.

Metaphor

Metaphors are figures of speech, often classed as one kind among many, to be contrasted with metonymy, synecdoche, prosopopoeia, and so on. However, from the philosophical point of view, it is the similarities between the figures of speech that are of central concern—and in particular, the *figurative use of language* which they exemplify, and which is manifest most clearly in metaphor. In developing a philosophical theory of metaphor, I shall be attempting to account for figurative language generally. And much as the study of the various tropes and their distinguishing marks may be of interest to rhetoric and literary theory, the single instance of metaphor will introduce issues which almost all of them raise for the philosopher. By metaphor I shall mean what Aristotle meant: the deliberate application of a term or phrase to something that is known not to exemplify it. (If you don't like this wide usage, just substitute some other term for 'metaphor'.)

At once we have a problem. If you deliberately apply some predicate to an object, are you not thereby assuming that it *does* apply? What is the content of the expression 'known not to apply'? If you are a nominalist, and believe that there is no further explanation for the fact that we classify things as we

do, that the application of predicates is the ultimate fact, then it is indeed hard to distinguish metaphorical from other usages. The only distinction we could have in mind is between old uses and new ones. A metaphorical use is one of which we have yet to acquire the habit. Such is the theory of metaphor espoused by the arch-nominalist Nelson Goodman, in *Languages of Art*, and it is one that conveniently brings discussion to a close.

Too conveniently, however. If anything were to show the incoherence of nominalism, it is metaphor. It is precisely our consciousness of metaphor that enables us to distinguish the case when something really *is* blue, say, from the case when our judgement that something is blue depends for its point upon its falsehood. So clearly are we conscious of this that the word 'literally' has all but replaced 'truly' and 'really' in everyday speech.

Again someone might have qualms about a theory of metaphor that concentrates only on the metaphorical application of *predicates*. For is it not the whole sentence that bears the burden of falsehood, and not merely the predicate that is 'misapplied'? To cut a long story short, I believe that metaphorical predication is, if not the only, at least the central, example of the phenomenon that I wish to analyse. There can be metaphorical names—as when I call my horse 'Apollo' for his beauty—but their being *names* is precisely what is not metaphorical about them. Apollo is so called because of his beauty: but he really (literally) *is* Apollo: not the god, of course, but that particular horse. This animal is what the name 'Apollo' refers to; and it is plausible to suppose, with Kripke and Putnam,[1] that, in the case of proper names, reference determines sense, so that there is no such thing as a metaphorical name—or rather, that the metaphor in a name is no part of its function *as a name*. If there is a metaphor here, it resides in a cryptopredication: I convey the thought that this horse has the attributes of the god of music, even though of course no such thing is true. And when a metaphor is achieved through the use of nouns rather than adjectives, it is still via an act of predication, as in Macbeth's immensely expressive muddle of equestrian imagery:

[1] Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*; Putnam, 'Is Semantics Possible?', in *Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers*, ii (cambridge, 1975). The view is associated with Russell, and attributed to him explicitly by G. E. M. Anscome, *An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus* (London 1959; 3rd edn., London, 1967), ch. 2. For a more cautious approach, in sympathy with Kripke and Putnam, see J. McDowell, 'On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name', in Mark Platts (ed.), *Reference, Truth and Reality* (London, 1980). The theory that metaphor consists always in a shift in a deviant *predication* is implicit in I. A. Richards's seminal account in *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (London, 1936), and has been elaborated in a series of works by Paul Ricœur—see esp. *La Métaphore vive* (Paris, 1976).

> I have no spur
>
> To pinch the sides of my intent, but only
> Vaulting ambition, which o'er-leaps itself
> And falls on the other [side].

In isolating the predicate as the crucial part of the metaphor, I follow Max Black's distinction between the *focus* of the metaphor (the crucial predicate) and the sentential frame.[2] But there is a deeper reason for this, and one which was perceived by Aristotle. Metaphors are, as their Greek name implies, transferred from another context—from the central context which gives their sense. We learn the predicate 'blue' by learning to apply it to what is literally blue: and then we transfer the predicate to things (such as music) which are not or cannot be blue. This act of transference has a purpose for us, a role in a language game, to use Wittgenstein's idiom. A theory of metaphor should tell us what this purpose is.

There is a distinction between metaphor and simile which helps to clarify the argument. In a simile, A is likened to B, the implication being that the likeness could be spelled out, that there is some respect in which the two objects agree. To say that 'the Assyrian came down like the wolf on the fold' is to say something that is literally true (assuming the story is not a fiction). Everything resembles everything else in *some* respect: and the greater or more significant the resemblance, the greater the 'degree of truth' in the simile. Many of the elaborate figures in Homer, Virgil, and Milton take the form of similes: indeed, in epic poetry metaphor is used sparingly, since it curtails those great arches of comparison which give the narrative its breadth and universality.

All the same, the point of a simile is not exhausted by its truthfulness—not even by its 'truth to life'. Like a metaphor, the simile has to 'work', and its *working* consists in an alchemical transformation of the reader's response. Critics have disputed whether Addison's comparison of the Duke of Marlborough to an avenging angel, in this famous passage from 'The Campaign', is really apt:

'Twas then great Marlbro's mighty soul was prov'd
That, in the shock of charging hosts unmov'd,
Amidst confusion, horror, and despair,
Examin'd all the dreadful scenes of war;
In peaceful thought the field of death survey'd,
To fainting squadrons sent the timely aid,
Inspir'd repuls'd battalions to engage,
And taught the doubtful battle where to rage.

2 Black, 'Metaphor', in *Models and Metaphors: Seudies in Language and Philosophy* (Ithaca, NY, 1962) and 'More about Metaphor', in A. Ortony (ed.), *Metaphor and Thought* (2nd edn., Cambridge, 1993).

end p.82

So when an angel by divine command
With rising tempests shakes a guilty land,
Such as of late o'er pale Britannia past,
Calm and serene he drives the furious blast;
And, pleas'd th'Almighty's orders to perform,
Rides in the whirlwind, and directs the storm.

According to Dr Johnson,[3] while the sentiments of this passage are just and noble, the simile is a failure: not because it is untrue, but because it is too obviously *true*. The action attributed to Marlborough, and that attributed to the angel, he argued, are one and the same, while 'a poetical simile consists in the discovery of likeness between two actions, in their general nature and disposition dissimilar'. You do not have to agree with Johnson's judgement of Addison's lines, in order to see the rightness of his meaning. The success of figurative language consists precisely in bringing dissimilar things together, in creating a relation where previously there was none. And this relation is created in the reader's experience; the success of a simile, therefore, is no different from that of a metaphor. The presence or absence of a comparative, such as 'like' or 'as', is of little significance besides the fusion that is achieved in the perfect metaphor, and equally in the successful simile. In neither case is the point of the figure displayed by *spelling out* the analogy, showing that just this or that feature is shared between Marlborough and the angel, the Assyrian and the wolf. Consider the following sequence of similes:

If I can stave off thought, which—as a whelp
Clings to its teat—sticks to me through the abyss
Of this odd labyrinth; or as the kelp
Holds by the rock; or as a lover's kiss
Drains its first draught of lips:—but, as I said,
I *won't* philosophize, and *will* be read.

(Byron, *Don Juan*, 10. 28)

The three similes draw on the same analogy: between the tenacity of thought and the tenacity of other things. But as the mind ranges over the comparisons, encountering animal, vegetable, and human attachment, maternal warmth, sea-cold, and erotic passion, and all the time comparing these with a tenacity that is not physical at all, the result is precisely one of supreme ironic *de*tachment. It is not the analogy that creates this effect, but the dislocating nature of the images, fused one by one with the thing that half-rejects them.

The surface grammar of a simile may belie a metaphorical intention, as when Eliot writes:

3 'Addison', in *Lives of the English Poets* (Everyman edition, London, 1925), i. 353.

end p.83

Midnight shakes the memory
As a madman shakes a dead geranium.

('Rhapsody on a Windy Night', in *Prufrock, and Other Observations*)

Midnight does not literally shake, nor is the memory literally shaken; the comparison implied by 'as' assumes a prior metaphorical transfer. And even so, it cannot be carried through. Midnight is not like a madman, nor memory like a dead geranium. Nor do the lines imply the contrary; rather, they bring the image of a madman shaking a dead geranium into proximity with the poet at midnight, helplessly and uselessly 'remembering things'. The result is not a comparison but a highly imaginative fusion, of the kind we know from metaphor.

Even when the comparison is genuine, a simile may owe its power to metaphors and images which crowd in under its protection, as when Shakespeare writes:

> nor can
>
> Her heart inform her tongue: the swan's downfeather
> That stands upon the swell at full of tide
> And neither way inclines.
>
> (*Antony and Cleopatra*, III. ii. 47-50)

The comparison of the tongue to a feather imports another and more impressive image—that of the tide, and thereby the vastness of human passion, the unknown depths from which feeling springs, and the impotence of reason (the swan's downfeather) in the attempt to master it.

To appreciate the proximity of simile and metaphor is to see the insufficiency of theories which assign to metaphors a secondary meaning, saying that while they are false when taken literally, they may be true when taken metaphorically—that in their metaphorical use they attribute to a subject properties which it actually *has*, and which we are able to see that it has, thanks to the comparison. It is not simile that is the paradigm of transferred predication, but metaphor; and it is in terms of metaphor that simile should be explained. The point of a simile is identical with the point of a metaphor: not to describe an object, but to *change its aspect*, so that we respond to it in another way.

This is possible precisely because terms used metaphorically, like those which occur in a simile, are used with their ordinary sense. This point may be appreciated from an example of Wittgenstein's:[4] suppose someone asks himself the following question: 'Which is fat and which lean, Tuesday or Wednesday?' He will at once seize upon an answer that seems right to him: Wednesday is fat, say. Asked what he means by 'fat' he will reply, 'What

4 *Philosophical Investigations*, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford, 1953) pt 2, § 11.

end p.84

I have always meant'. The point is that he wishes to use precisely *this* term, with its ordinary meaning, *here*. The central examples *show the meaning* of the term, and this is the meaning that it has, even when applied in a metaphor.

This observation has great significance in the philosophy of art, as I tried to show in *Art and Imagination*. It rules out many theories of metaphor, but also many theories of expression and aesthetic description. Someone might argue, for example, that the word 'sad' in the sentence 'The music is sad' has a secondary meaning, going on to spell out what this meaning is—what features of a work of music must be present if it is truly to be sad. But that misses the whole point of the judgement, which is that I should wish to use *this* word, with its ordinary meaning, *here*, where it does *not* (literally) apply. Nor could someone learn the meaning of the word 'sad' by attending exclusively to sad pieces of music: it is to the central examples that he must turn, even in order to know what is meant when the predicate is used of music.

A distinction is sometimes made between dead and living metaphors. The idea is that a metaphor, when too much used, *does* change the meaning of the term, so that it comes to extend quite literally to the new examples. The sign of this is that you could learn the meaning of the term from examples which were once only metaphorically described by it. Many people learn the meaning of the word 'bastard' in this way, without knowing what it originally referred to. In such a case the metaphor has not merely died: its death has split the sense of the word in two. It now has two independent meanings, which could be grasped without reference to each other. A dead metaphor is part of the archaeology of living usage.

Most effective metaphors could never die in that way, since the connection that they make is unique to the context of their utterance, and incapable of being severed from it. When Mallarmé describes a trinket as 'aboli bibelot d'inanité sonore', he creates a fusion of senses that is irrepeatable. Inanity cannot be sonorous: yet here it resounds in a cavernous hollow of negation.

The Point of Metaphor

As I have suggested, we should not try to translate such a metaphor into its 'literal' equivalent. In understanding a literal sentence, I acquire a grasp of its truth-conditions. In understanding a metaphor I come to see its point—or, when it fails, its pointlessness. The intention of the speaker is to bring me to share the experience that prompts his description: the experience of seeing and responding to one thing in terms suggested by another.

This is the aim, too, of a simile. Consider Milton's description of Satan, as he stands before his defeated army, summoning them to counsel:

end p.85

As when the Sun new ris'n
Looks through the horizontal misty Air
Shorn of his Beams, or from behind the Moon
In dim Eclips disastrous twilight sheds
On half the Nations, and with fear of change
Perplexes Monarchs. Dark'n'd so, yet shon
Above them all th'Arch Angel: but his face
Deep scars of Thunder had intrencht, and care
Sat on his faded cheek, but under Browes
Of dauntless courage, and considerate Pride
Waiting revenge. . .
(*Paradise Lost*, 1. 594-604)

The point of such a comparison lies not so much in the analogy, which is merely a vehicle, but in the transformation of the reader's experience. Satan comes before us in another aspect; in his face we see the eclipsed and thwarted sunlight, and the menace of his vengeance is received as that primeval menace, in which the light of nature glows black and half-extinguished, threatening the end of all. In metaphors, such vast transformations are condensed into a single word or phrase, as when Rilke writes: 'so reißt die Spur der Fledermaus durch Porzellan des Abends', and the lightning hair-crack along a piece of porcelain fuses with the unseen flutter of a bat in the twilight.

To describe this fusion of experience, and its effect on us, is not easy. But here, briefly, is the theory that I defended in earlier work and which I shall adopt now as a working hypothesis. We are able to attend not only to the inner reality of objects, but also to their appearance. In aesthetic experience our senses are saturated by the appearances of things, which take on a fascination that is especially significant, in that its origin lies in *us*. We are appreciating objects as they are *for us*, and so bringing them into a kind of personal relation. The jar as it is for me is not the jar as it is in itself, but rather a bridge between me and the outer world, so that 'a Chinese jar still/ Moves perpetually in its stillness'. Sometimes, however, I can concentrate on the appearance of one thing, while attending equally to the appearance of another, and my response to the second is transferred to the first. I come to vibrate in sympathy with both simultaneously. I thereby make a connection between them—a connection that is real in my emotions, but only imagined in the objects themselves.

The resulting experience is one with a 'double intentionality'. It is directed towards two appearances simultaneously, and forbids their separation. A simple case of this—which Richard Wollheim[5] has called 'representational seeing', but which, for reasons that will become apparent, I prefer to call

5 *Painting as an Art* (London, 1987).

end p.86

'aspect perception'—is the case in which one thing is seen in another. This is a clear instance of double intentionality. When I see a face in a picture, then, in the normal aesthetic context, I am not seeing a picture *and* a face; nor am I seeing a resemblance between the picture and a face. The face and the picture are fused in my perception: which is not to say that I confuse the one with the other, or mistake the reality of either. I am presented with two simultaneous objects of perception: the *real* picture, and the *imaginary* face. And my response to each is fused with my response to the other. For example I respond to the flowing lines and flesh-tints with emotions and expectations that derive from my experience of faces, and to the face with emotions and expectations that arise from my interest in colour, harmony, and expressive line. The fusion is effected at the highest level of rational interest, while being transcribed into the perception itself.

A parallel experience arises in the understanding of metaphor. I am not merely thinking of the bat's flight *in terms of* a hairline crack in porcelain; nor am I making analogies, or confusing objects that are simultaneously imagined. On the contrary, as in the case of the picture, the effect depends upon my recognizing the impassable difference—the metaphysical gulf—between the two objects of my response. In no way can the crack and the bat's flight be confused in reality, since the two experiences belong to different contexts and even different sense-modalities. (You sense the bat through a kind of subliminal cringe of the body.)

Just as every line, shade, and nuance of the painted surface enters into and conditions my experience of the face, so does the very syntax and sound of the metaphor inhabit my experience of the thing described. Mallarmé's internal rhymes, inverted syntax, and sudden emptying of sound into the abysmal vowels of *sonore* transform the appearance of that 'abolished trinket', so that its triviality becomes also a poignant 'pastness', a thing mindlessly cherished, now gone for ever.

Of course, there are important differences between aspects and metaphors, and I do not claim to have given in those few paragraphs a complete theory of either. But I hope that aspect perception provides sufficient proof of double intentionality to suggest a plausible way of looking at metaphor. David Cooper, in his study of metaphor, dismisses the comparison, arguing that when we predicate a term of an object metaphorically, it is absurd to say that we are seeing the object *as* that term suggests, or that we have the particular experience of the 'dawning of an aspect'.[6] And that is certainly true. Nevertheless, aspect perception provides a paradigm of double intentionality;

[6] *Metaphor* (London, 1986), 227-38. For the contrasting view, which makes aspect perception *central* to the understanding of metaphor, see Marcus B. Hester, *The Meaning* of *Poetic Metaphor* (The Hague, 1967).

end p.87

and it is *this* feature which is important in our understanding of metaphor. Before returning to music, something should be said about the mental capacity which is exercised whenever intentionality doubles itself in this way.

Imagination

Everyday cognitive activity involves perception, belief, and information-gathering. It is an activity that is common to many animal species, and certainly not distinctive of man. However, rational beings—of which man and his gods are the only known examples—have capacities which are not to be found elsewhere. Imagination is one of them.

Rationality involves the ability to represent to ourselves absent or hypothetical situations, to project our thought in a speculative arch away from the immediate present, into regions which are past or future, possible or impossible, probable or improbable, and from which it returns with insight into the nature of things. Animals draw conclusions from their experience: else why should the horse jump the fence and not go crashing through it? But this 'drawing of conclusions' is confined to the immediate data, and the rules of thumb that transform the data into premisses for action. Rational beings think in terms of past, future, and possible worlds—even impossible worlds, as is shown by fiction. And we do this because we can think in symbols. Language represents the not-now and the not-here, and spreads them before us on equal terms with the here and now.

In our normal commerce with the world, we move like the animals among things that we perceive, gathering information and pursuing our desires with the robust sense of actuality that guides the cat to the mouse, the fox to the pheasant, and the horse to his stable. In these circumstances perception is informed by belief, and thought seeks the truth about the world before us. Some philosophers argue, indeed, that perception must be understood *in terms of* the gathering of information. At any rate, the intentionality of ordinary perception is like that of belief—it involves a mental affirmation of a proposition about the perceivable world.

Propositions may be affirmed; but they may also be entertained without affirming them. The capacity to do this—and to do it constructively—is part of what I mean by imagination. It is necessarily true that every rational being has this capacity to some degree; for it is exemplified by inference itself. As Frege argued, the fact that a sentence is *asserted* cannot be part of its meaning; else how would the inference from *p* and *p* implies *q* to *q* be valid, when *p* is asserted in the first step, and unasserted in the second?[7]

[7] Frege, 'The Thought', in P. F. Strawson (ed.), *Philosophical Logic* (Oxford 1967); P. T. Geach, 'On Assertion', in *Logic Matters* (Oxford, 1972).

end p.88

Every inference involves this capacity to entertain a proposition in its unasserted form: and it is the very same proposition that is asserted or affirmed when we believe it to be true.

'Unasserted thought' plays an important role also in imagery. When I form an image of some absent or fictitious thing, my image stands to my thought much as the memory image stands to my beliefs about the past. It is the 'sensuous shining', to use a Hegelian phrase, of an unasserted thought, just as the memory image is the sensuous shining of a belief about the past. As to what images *are*, this is a question that we need not explore.[8] For present purposes it is not imagery, but imaginative perception that we must analyse.

Suppose I see a man standing before me in a threatening posture. My instinct is to be on my guard. I *expect* something, and fear it; and I respond accordingly. My behaviour is adequately accounted for by the fact that what I see I also believe to be there. Indeed seeing, in such a case, is believing. The visual experience has the intentionality of a belief: it is an unqualified affirmation that *this* is how things are.

Suppose now that I see a man standing with the same threatening posture, but in a picture. My instinct is to look, to study, to enjoy this meditation on the phenomenon of anger. I expect nothing, fear nothing, and am given over entirely to the way things look. Here my behaviour is accounted for by the fact that what I see I also believe *not* to be there. I am 'seeing without belief'. The visual experience has the intentionality of an unasserted thought: it speaks to me of possibilities, not actualities, and contains no affirmation that this is how things are.

From the cognitive point of view, the two experiences are as different as can be. The one is linked to fear and flight, the other to peaceful meditation; the one fixes me in the here and now, in a condition of maximum alertness; the other allows me to drift free of the present reality, and to lose myself in thought. At the same time, there is surely a great resemblance between them. There is a sense in which the world looks the same in ordinary perception, and in its 'unasserted' version. The image in the picture is the image precisely of a man, who stands and threatens, and who is indistinguishable from the real man who had seemed to threaten me. What I see in the picture corresponds exactly to all that is revealed to me as I stand on my guard: the same colours, outline, and so on. (Such could be the case, at any rate.) Yet the intentional content is so different that the experiences can be compared in no other way.

But now we see why the experience of aspect perception is available to the rational being, and why it is important to him. When I see the picture, and the man portrayed in it, the intentionality of perception can double

[8] I address this question in *Art and Imagination* (London, 1974), pt II.

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itself, precisely because there is no conflict between the images. I am not being torn between rival beliefs, as I would be by a *trompe l'œil* mural, wondering whether this is a painting *or* a man. I can approach it as both a painting *and* a man, precisely because the man does not belong to the world in which the painting is situated. I believe this thing before me is a painting, and merely *think of* the man within it. This is the peculiar experience that imagination makes available—the coming-together in a single perception of asserted and unasserted thought.

The very same capacity is exercised in the making and understanding of metaphor. This is why the *falsehood* of a metaphor is so important a part of it. It is the impossibility of believing that the evening really *is* porcelain that enables me to think of it *as* porcelain: to hold this thought in suspension before my mind, until the imagined perceptions of a bat flitting through the evening air, and a crack running through porcelain coalesce in a single image. In the examples that I have given, both of metaphor and of simile, we encounter the singular freedom that is gained by thought, when emancipated from the duty of believing things. Thoughts entertained simultaneously can coalesce in single images—images of which we can venture no better description than is provided by the metaphor itself. For the metaphor is the verbal expression of an experience made available precisely by *that form of words*.

The freedom of imaginative thought-processes is manifested in another way namely, in the voluntary character of the experiences that depend on them. You cannot command someone to believe that the moon is made of cheese, but you can command him to imagine it. Similarly, you cannot command someone to see a dagger before his eyes, but you can command him to form an image of it. Likewise, standing before a painting, I can ask you to see it, not as a portrait of a child, but as the portrait of a dwarf with child-like features, not as the portrait of a woman, but as the portrait of a man in woman's clothing. The familiar examples of ambiguous figures, which we can see now one way, now another, are not the exceptions: they are simply the clearest instances of a universal freedom that we have, when that which we see is seen without believing. The change of aspect is a change from one experience to another: but it is not precipitated by any change in visual information; it involves the transition from one unasserted thought to another, each embodied in a visual image whose sensory contours remain unchanged.

This does not mean that I have *total* freedom: for of course, my perception is constrained by the material object. Nor does it mean that every way of seeing a picture is equally *right*. On the contrary, here as elsewhere, freedom implies the possibility of criticism. Reasons can be given for a 'way of seeing', and criticism has the production of those reasons as its goal.

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The Indispensable Metaphor

When I use a metaphor in order to describe the real world, it is often shorthand for a complex truth. Eliminating the metaphor will then reveal that truth, laid bear to the eye of pure believing. I can spell out *homo homini lupus*, for instance, by describing the known facts of man's aggression towards his fellows, and in one sense this is what the metaphor means. Of course, I have not captured the 'point' of the metaphor, in the particular context of its utterance. For there may still be the peculiar coalescence which comes from our knowledge that whatever else man may be, he is not, literally, a wolf. But it has to be a very special context that would bring *this* tired metaphor to life again. For all intents and purposes, it is now dispensable.

The same can be said about any metaphor that is used to convey a truth about the material world. There are no metaphorical facts, since all metaphors are false—or true only 'in passing', as in John Donne's famous 'No man is an island', which touches truth on its way to the magnificent falsehood that we are all parts of a continent. In so far as we are interested in describing the reality, we could dispense with metaphors, even those 'metaphors we live by' that have been agreeably (though contentiously) surveyed by Mark Johnson and George Lakoff.[9] There are those who doubt that this is so—who argue with Derrida that language is fundamentally metaphorical, and that every literal use is founded on a metaphor that undermines it.[10] But life is too short to mount the full refutation of such a view, which if true, must also be false, since at least one thing would then be literally true. A metaphor comes about when a term is transferred from the use which gives its meaning, to a context where it does not, or even cannot, apply. There can be metaphors, therefore, only where there are also literal uses; to deny this is to deny the possibility of meaning anything at all. (A denial that Derrida's writings illustrate but in no way justify.)

Nevertheless, there are contexts in which metaphors seem indispensable: not merely because they are part of some unique literary experience, as in the examples that I have considered, but because we are using them to describe something other than the material world; in particular because we are attempting to describe how the world *seems*, from the point of view of the active imagination.

Kant maintained that every experience that is referred to the material world must also be 'brought under concepts'. Intentionality requires the application of concepts, which determine *how* the world appears in the perspective of my attention. But Kant did not directly distinguish two kinds of concept-application: in a judgement, as he called it, and in imagination.

9 *Metaphors We Live By*.

10 'La Mythologie blanche', in *Marges de la philosophie* (Paris, 1972).

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In my example, when I see the man standing before me, my perception is informed by concepts—and in particular by the concept: *man*. But here the concept is applied in a judgement: seeing is believing, and I am disposed to take the world *for* what I see. When I see the man in the picture, the concept: *man* likewise informs my perception. But it is not applied in a judgement: appearance is all, and while I entertain thoughts about this man before me, I do not affirm them to be true. Here we might say that a concept is applied in a perception, but transferred from its central use. Moreover, it is impossible to eliminate the transferred usage, and still describe the way the world seems. This transferred usage defines the intentional object of my perception, as nothing else can define it.

The peculiar intimacy of concept and experience in perception has often been commented upon. A perceptual experience is not an *interpretation* of some raw 'intuition': it is animated and informed by thought. Hence many philosophers speak of perception as a kind of 'representation', and seek to explain intentionality (here as elsewhere) in terms of the mental representation of the world. To enter this debate would take us too far from our purpose: although I shall have something to say about it in Chapter 7. The important point is to recognize that, however intimate the connection between experience and concept may be, it does not fully define the intentionality of an experience. In order to complete the account of intentionality, we need to know whether the concept is asserted in the experience, or merely entertained. And if it is merely entertained, how is it entertained? The indispensable metaphor occurs when the way the world seems depends upon an imaginative involvement with it, rather than on our ordinary cognitive goals. And this is the case when we listen to music.

The Life in Music

I argued in Chapter 2 that there lies, in our most basic apprehension of music, a complex system of metaphor, which is the true description of no material fact, not even a fact about sounds, judged as secondary objects. The metaphor

cannot be eliminated from the description of music, because it defines the intentional object of the musical experience. Take the metaphor away, and you cease to describe the experience of music. Perhaps the metaphors could be revised in certain respects. It may be that we could regard the descriptions 'high' and 'low' as dispensable, replaceable by other metaphors, such as the French *aigu* and *grave*. But this local variation involves no rejection of the spatial metaphor, nor of the sense that movement to higher frequencies is a movement *upwards*—a movement which *lifts* the melodic line *above* its former location. Indeed, what would it be like to dispense altogether with the experience of space? We should then

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cease to hear orientation in music; tones would no longer move towards or away from each other; no phrase would mirror another, no leaps be bolder or larger than others, and so on. In short, the experience of music would involve neither melody nor counterpoint as we know them. Musical movement would have been reduced to a static pulse: in which case, why should we continue to talk of music? If the metaphors are dispensable, it is only for the trivial reason that our world might not have contained the experience of music. But that too could be doubted: for perhaps it is in the nature of reason, to hear sounds in just this way?

If the description of music is so dependent on metaphor, then we might go on to conclude that music is not, strictly speaking, a part of the material world of sound. A scientific description of the world of sound would not mention, as an independent fact of the matter, the phenomenon of music. There is no explanatory function to be filled by the concept of music that will not equally be filled by the concept of organized sound: no scientific method could discriminate between the two, the extension of each concept in the material world being the same. If there is an additional *fact* of the matter, it is that we (beings of a certain kind) hear music. Music belongs uniquely to the intentional sphere, and not to the material realm.

Someone might object, however, that the argument shows no more than that musical properties and relations are secondary, rather than primary, properties of sounds. To deny on such grounds that they are part of the material world in some significant sense (some sense that does not merely reiterate the scientific realist's commitment to the explanatory priority of primary qualities) is to repeat a mistake at least as old as Berkeley. It is to think that because the sense of a term ('red', for example) is to be specified in terms of a certain experience involved in its application, its reference must therefore be to the experience—the 'idea'—and not to any material reality.

It is true that the terms used to describe music *refer* to material sounds. But they refer to them under a description that no material sound can satisfy. Sounds do not move as music moves (so as to 'reach into the silence'). Nor are they organized in a spatial way, nor do they rise and fall. Yet this is how we hear them when we hear them as music.

The case is quite different from that of secondary qualities for another reason. The ability to perceive a secondary quality is a sensory capacity, and depends only upon the power of sensory discrimination. Many animals discriminate sensory qualities better than we do (bees, for example, perceive a wider range of colours, birds a wider range of sound qualities). This ability does not depend upon superior intellect, nor upon any other faculty that might be improved or impaired through education. It is this that leads us to think of secondary qualities as *inherent* in the objects that possess them. For no reasoning or discussion of the matter can lead us to perceive or dissuade

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us from perceiving them: they are inexorably there, for any creature blessed, or cursed, with the appropriate apparatus.

Musical qualities, however, are not secondary qualities. They are like aspects—what might be called tertiary qualities, in recognition of the fact that, while part of the appearance of something, they are not objects merely of sensory perception. Such tertiary qualities are neither deduced from experience nor invoked in the explanation of experience. They are perceived only by rational beings, and only through a certain exercise of imagination, involving the transfer of concepts from another sphere.

In what sense such qualities are really *in* the object in which they are heard is a difficult question, to which I shall return. But their objectivity is at least *put in question* by the fact that only imaginative beings can perceive them. Like every object of imaginative perception, they are subject to the will, and the object of conscious and subconscious choices. That is why criticism is possible, here as in the case of painting. You can give arguments for hearing the drum-beats that open Beethoven's Violin Concerto, Op. 61, as a sustained up-beat, or as part of the melody; and the choice lies with the listener. Look carefully at the parallel with pictures, and you will see that musical perception involves all those features that I have attributed to the imagination, and could not exist in the mind of a creature incapable of imaginative thought.

Non-Conceptual Content

Kant argued that experience involves a synthesis of intuition (the sensory component) and concept; it is by virtue of this synthesis that perceptions are also 'representations'. However, he also argued that intuition exhibits a preconceptual order, which is the order of space and time. Space and time, for Kant, were not concepts but 'forms of intuition', and experience is ordered spatially and temporally prior to any representation of its object.

In a similar vein, recent philosophers (notably Christopher Peacocke)[11] have distinguished the 'conceptual' from the 'non-conceptual' content of experience, arguing that an object may be presented to a person's perception, even though he cannot identify it through concepts. This act of presentation is also a 'content', and implies a non-conceptual ordering—as when a figure emerges from a background, for someone who can say nothing whatsoever about the figure's nature.

The suggestion encourages us to distinguish the perceptual *Gestalt* from the interpretation placed upon it, and revives the Kantian notion of a 'unity of the manifold' which is 'given' preconceptually. Needless to say, the

11 *Sense and Content* (Oxford, 1983).

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suggestion has not escaped vigorous criticism,[12] and I find no great reason to accept it. Nevertheless, a philosopher who *did* accept it, might find himself sceptical of the position advanced in this chapter, according to which we hear music under an indispensable metaphorical description.[13] Why is the unity of a motif or melody not given 'preconceptually', like that of the visual *Gestalt*? Why assume that the metaphor with which we describe such unities, is also the intellectual act that creates them? Could we not hear melodies and harmonies as musical individuals, and fail to hear them in terms of space and movement?

The real question here is not whether there might be a preconceptual organization exhibited by the musical *Gestalt*, but whether it would be sufficient to hear this organisation in order to hear the music as *music*. And this I doubt. Consider the first phrase of 'Baa, Baa, Black Sheep', beginning on C. The phrase is composed as follows: two crotchets on C, two on G, and then four quavers on A, B, C, and A, leading again to G where the melody rests. It is quite possible that a listener should hear this as a unity, without hearing the movement that *we* hear in it. For him, as for us, the melody begins on C and pauses on G, with the intervening notes leading from the first note to the last. But he could organize the notes in this way, even though they had, for him, no direction: even though he discerned no upward movement from C to G; even though he did not hear that the quavers were moving the melody on in the *same direction*; even though the return to G thereafter involved no loss of the 'upward' impulse. Such a case would parallel that in which a person recognized a figure as standing against a ground, but had no knowledge of the figure's nature. Surely, however, we should say that our listener, even if he has perceived a musical unity, has not perceived it *as music*. He has heard the outline, but not the substance, and the crucial act of recognition, which is a recognition of movement, has yet to occur.

The point here is fundamental. You can imagine a person who heard and grouped adjacent sounds in ways that are quite different from those described in Chapter 2. You could, if you like, use the word 'music' to describe what he hears, simply in order to emphasize the similarity with our own experience. But *I* use the word precisely to emphasize the difference: the difference between hearing temporally organized sounds, and hearing *tones*.

12 e.g. J. McDowell, *Mind and World* (Cambridge, Mass., 1994).

13 See e.g. M. Budd, 'Understanding Music', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, suppl. vol. (1985), 239-45.

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The Imagined World of Tones

The picture at which we have arrived is this. In hearing sounds, we may attend to them in the way that we attend to pictures, on the look-out, or listen-out, for imaginative perceptions. There then arises the peculiar double intentionality that is exemplified in the experience of metaphor: one and the same experience takes sound as its object, and also something that is not and cannot be sound—the life and movement that is music. We hear this life and movement *in* the sound, and situate it in an imagined space, organized, as is the phenomenal space of our own experience, in terms of 'up' and 'down', 'rising' and 'falling', 'high' and 'low'.

Phenomenologists will draw their own conclusions from that theory. For they tell us that our everyday concept of space is not geometrical but phenomenal: it is derived from the experience of movement and the sense of the world's resistance to our will. At a deep level the sense of 'up' and 'down' are understood in terms of the toils and strains of our activity. (Hence those absurd attempts to explain the experience of *musical* movement by reference to the strain on the larynx as it ascends the scale.[14]) The metaphor of musical movement, since it has no other ground than the way

things appear to us, and cannot give way to a theory of musical space, is the pure phenomenal residue of our ordinary experience of space. And what is this phenomenal residue, other than a sense of the world's complex resistance to our will, and our own being-in-the-world as active organisms? Such, at least, would be the likely conclusion of a Sartre or a Merleau-Ponty. And they would be in broad agreement with Schopenhauer, although beginning from quite different premisses, that music is the presentation in appearance of the will.

It is too early, however, to draw such radical conclusions; and besides, the premisses of phenomenology are as dubious as those of Schopenhauer's idealism, accepted, like Schopenhauer's, for the ease with which they deliver results and not from any persuasive argument. So I shall rest, for the moment, with a minimal conclusion from the discussion of this chapter. Music is the intentional object of an experience that only rational beings can have, and only through the exercise of imagination. To describe it we must have recourse to metaphor, not because music resides in an analogy with other things, but because the metaphor describes exactly *what* we hear, when we hear sounds as music.

14 C. Stumpf, *Tonpsychologie*, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1883), vol. i. The suggestion is taken seriously by C. C. Pratt, *The Meaning of Music: A Study in Psychological Aesthetics* (New York, 1931), and even so penetrating a thinker as Paul Hindemith, in *A Composer's World*, 52 f, tries to understand musical movement in terms of the physical energies of the performer who produces it.

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4 Ontology

Abstract: Confronts certain puzzles raised about the nature and identity of the musical work, and dismisses these puzzles as unreal: either they concern the musical work itself, in which case they are puzzles about the metaphysical status of an intentional object, and therefore susceptible to an arbitrary solution, or they concern the sounds in which the work is heard, in which case they are simply special cases of the problems concerning the nature and identity of events.

Keywords: events, identity, intentional object, musical work, ontology

Roger Scruton

In describing the *phenomenal* nature of music, I have avoided raising the ontological question: what exactly *is* a work of music? When is work A the same as work B, and what hangs on the answer? And with this question of identity come others, no less interesting and no less difficult: what is the relation between a work and a (true) performance of it? What is the relation between a work and an *arrangement* of it? What do we mean by 'versions' of the same work? When judging a work of music, how do we separate the qualities of the music from those of the performance? If an improvisation is written down and played again, is that a performance of the very same work? And so on. Such questions may not be equally important, and they may also be less important than they have seemed to recent philosophers. Nevertheless we must answer some of them before we can give a clear account of the meaning of music.

Before beginning, however, there is a point of method that needs to be borne in mind. Several writers (notably Carl Dahlhaus, Edward Said, Lydia Goehr, and others influenced by Adorno)[1] have argued that the habit of identifying individual *works* of music is a recent one, coinciding with the rise of a listening public, and with the institution of concert-going as a cultural practice. Music was not always the solemn occasion that it has become in the culture of bourgeois Europe and America. Far more often in the history of mankind it has been part of a larger event: worship, dancing, ceremony, even battle. In such circumstances people do not stand back and focus on the piece itself, nor do they savour the sounds as modern listeners do. Some argue further, that aesthetic interest is not a human universal, as Kantian philosophers claim, but part of the ideology of bourgeois culture.[2]

1 Dahlhaus, *Esthetics of Music*, tr. W. Austin (Cambridge, 1982), and *The Idea of Absolute Music*, tr. R. Lustig (Chicago, 1989); Said, *Musical Elaborations* (London, 1991); Goehr, *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works* (Oxford, 1992).

2 See esp. P. Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, tr. R. Nice (London, 1984); and T. Eagleton, *The Ideology of the Aesthetic* (Oxford, 1990).

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Only in the context of that culture does the practice of identifying individual works of art and their authors make sense.

To both these claims I shall return in Chapters 14 and 15. But a preliminary response is called for, if we are to venture with confidence into the realm of musical ontology. It is an important and interesting observation, that the practice of *listening* to music, and in particular of listening to it in the reverent hush of a concert hall, is neither a human universal, nor the whole of musical experience. It is also an interesting observation (should it be true) that the habit of identifying